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Abstract
This paper introduces a new solution concept for cooperative games with gen-
eral coalitional structure in which only certain sets of players, including the set
of all players, are able to form feasible coalitions. The solution concept takes
into account the marginal contribution of players. This marginal contribution
can be a joint contribution of several players and is equally divided among those
players. Any set system representing a coalitional structure induces a collection
of coalitional trees, whose nodes may consist of subsets of players. As solution
we take the average of the marginal contribution vectors that correspond to
all coalitional trees. The solution is efficient and several other properties are
studied and some special cases are considered.
Keywords: TU game, cooperation structure, marginal contribution, set sys-
tem, Shapley value
JEL Classification Number: C71
1 Introduction
A situation in which a finite set of agents or players can cooperate, may form
coalitions of players and the total payoff obtained by this cooperation, its worth, is
freely distributed among the coalition members is called a cooperative game with
transferable utility or simply TU game. Assuming that the grand coalition of all
players forms, an efficient solution concept deals with the distribution of the total
payoff created through this cooperation. The Shapley value is the most well known
solution concept for TU games. The Shapley value is the average of all marginal
(contribution) vectors in the game. Each marginal vector in the game corresponds
to a permutation on the set of players. At such a vector, each player receives as
payoff the difference of the worth of the coalition consisting of himself together with
all his successors in the permutation and the worth of the coalition consisting of
only his successors.
Unlike the standard cooperative game theory assumption stating that all coali-
tion of players may form, in many practical situations the collection of feasible
coalitions in which players are able to cooperate and obtain some worth is restricted
by some social, economical, hierarchical or technical structure. In the literature,
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the incomplete nature of communication structure to cooperate is often represented
by a graph on the set of players. In TU games whose communication structure is
represented with a graph, so-called graph games, only the members of a connected
set of players are assumed to be able to cooperate. The best known solution concept
for graph games is the Myerson value introduced by Myerson (1977). The Myerson
value is defined as the Shapley value of the so called Myerson restricted game. Al-
though graph games are more general than TU games and can be applied to many
situations, they may still be not enough to explain some real life phenomenon. To
illustrate this insufficiency, consider a cooperative game defined on a set of political
parties. Being members of a large spectrum of political space, let us focus on one
extreme left-wing party (party L), one extreme right-wing party (party R) and one
center party (party C). Since party L and party C are able to cooperate in order to
form a government, then if we try to represent this situation with a graph these two
parties need to be connected. Similarly, party R and party C need to be connected
in the graph because they might be able to cooperate as well. Also the three parties
together may form a feasible coalition and form a national government. However,
each of the three parties are typically not be able to form the government by them-
selves, because they are too small. A single party is therefore not a feasible coalition
in this case. This situation cannot be represented by a graph structure because by
definition the single nodes of a graph are connected sets.
In this paper, we allow for an arbitrary collection of feasible coalitions that are
able to cooperate and obtain some worth. We only assume that the grand coalition
is always able to form. Considering the example on political parties again, one could
assume only the existence of feasible coalitions of party L with party C, of party
R with party C, and the grand coalition of all three parties. For such coalitional
games, as solution concept we propose the average coalitional tree solution, being the
average of the marginal vectors that correspond to all maximal nested sets in the set
system representing the coalitional structure. A maximal nested set is a collection of
feasible coalitions such that for any two different coalitions in the collection, either
one of them is a subset of the other or they are disjoint, and, moreover, the union of
two or more disjoint coalitions in the collection is not a feasible coalition. Depending
on the coalitional structure, a maximal nested set may consist of less coalitions than
the number of players. In the example of political parties above, there are two
maximal nested sets, each containing the grand coalition and one of the two other
feasible two-party coalitions. In this example there are no singletons in a maximal
nested set, because the single parties are not feasible. To each maximal nested
set a coalitional tree corresponds. In a coalitional tree each node is a coalition,
which may not be feasible by its own, but together with its set of successors it is
always feasible and it is a member of the maximal nested set. For each of these
coalitional trees, a marginal vector is defined, at which the players at a node receive
together as payoff the marginal contribution when they join to their successors in
the tree and this payoff is equally distributed among them. In the example above, if
the maximal nested set consisting of the grand coalition and the coalition of party
L together with party C is considered, then at the corresponding marginal vector
party L and party C equally share their own joint worth and party R receives its
marginal contribution to them. The average coalitional tree solution is single-valued
and satisfies efficiency, linearity, equal treatment of equivalent players, and the null
player property, amongst others. Also some special cases are considered.
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Aguilera et al. (2010) also consider games with arbitrary coalitional structures
and define what they call the Shapley value for such games. Instead of maximal
nested sets they consider maximal chains in the set system and take as solution
the average of the marginal vectors corresponding to all marginal chains. A chain
is a collection of feasible coalitions such that for any two different members one
of them is a subset of the other. Hence, chains do not consider the cases where
one or more players are able to join simultaneously to two or more feasible disjoint
coalitions whose union is not feasible, to form a larger feasible coalition. A chain
only considers the marginal contribution of a set of players when it joins only one
feasible coalition. Therefore, the two concepts of maximal chain and maximal nested
set differ from each other. A maximal chain is always a nested set, not necessarily
being maximal, and when a maximal chain is not a maximal nested set it must be a
proper subset of at least one maximal nested set. A similar approach with maximal
chains is employed in Grabisch and Lange (2009) for more restricted structures.
They consider regular set systems where the feasible coalitions form a poset whose
maximal chains all have the same length. They propose an axiomatization of the
Shapley value for this class of games.
In the literature, a large collection of papers consider specific classes of set sys-
tems as a way to represent limited cooperation among the players. In all of these re-
searches, some restrictions are assumed on the set systems. Among these researches,
Algaba et al. (2001) consider union stable cooperation structures, Bilbao and Edel-
man (2000) consider convex geometries, Bilbao et al. (2001) consider matroids,
Algaba et al. (2003) consider antimatroids, Bilbao and Ordonez (2007) consider
augmenting systems, Ui et al. (2011) consider complete coalition structures, and
Koshevoy and Talman (2011) consider building sets. For building sets the solution
given in Koshevoy and Talman (2011) coincides with the average coalitional tree
solution.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Basic definitions and notation are given
in Section 2. Section 3 introduces the new solution concept for coalitional games.
Some properties of the solution concept are given in Section 4. Section 5 considers
some special coalitional structures.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Coalitional game
A transferable utility (TU) game with coalitional structure or coalitional game is a
triple (N, v,F), where N = {1, ..., n} is a finite set of players, F ⊆ 2N is a set system
on N representing the coalitional structure and containing N , and v : F → R is
a characteristic function satisfying v(∅) = 0. A set S ∈ F is a feasible coalition
and the real number v(S) represents the worth of feasible coalition S, which can be
freely distributed among its members. We denote the set of coalitional games with a
fixed player set N by GN . For simplicity of notation and if no ambiguity appears we
write (v,F) instead of (N, v,F) when we refer to a coalitional game with player set
N and whose coalitional structure is represented by F and characteristic function
by v.
A payoff vector is a vector x ∈ IRN with ith component xi the payoff to player
i ∈ N . A value on GN is a function ξ : GN → IRN that assigns to coalitional game
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(v,F) ∈ GN the payoff vector ξ(v,F) ∈ IRN . In the sequel, we use notation x(S) =∑
i∈S xi for any payoff vector x ∈ IR
N and S ⊆ N . |A| denotes the cardinality of a
finite set A.
2.2 Coalitional tree
Given a partition P of the set of players N , (P, T ) stands for a coalitional directed
graph, or coalitional digraph, on P, where T ⊆ {(P1, P2) | P1, P2 ∈ P, P1 6= P2} is a
collection of directed links on the set of members of the partition P of N . A coali-
tional digraph may be seen as a generalization of a directed graph, or digraph, where
the nodes, being elements of N , are replaced with subsets of N that together form a
partition of N and the directed links are defined on these subsets. Given a partition
P of N and a coalitional digraph (P, T ) on P, a sequence of different members of
P, (P1, ..., Pk) with k ≥ 2, is a directed coalitional path in (P, T ), from P1 to Pk if
(Ph, Ph+1) ∈ T for h = 1, ..., k−1. If there exists a directed coalitional path in (P, T )
from P ∈ P to P ′ ∈ P, then P ′ is a successor of P and P is a predecessor of P ′. If
(P, P ′) ∈ T then P ′ is an immediate successor of P and P is an immediate prede-
cessor of P ′. For any P ∈ P, ST (P ) denotes the union of all successors of P in the
coalitional digraph (P, T ) and ST (P ) denotes the union of successors of P together
with the members of P , i.e., ST (P ) = ST (P ) ∪ P . Furthermore, IT (P ) denotes the
set of immediate successors of P in (P, T ), i.e., IT (P ) = {P ′ ∈ P|(P, P ′) ∈ T}. For
simplicity of notation and if no ambiguity appears we write T when we refer to a
coalitional diagraph (P, T ) on a given partition P of N .
A coalitional digraph (P, T ) on a given partition P of N is a coalitional tree if
there exists a unique member of the partition P, called the coalitional root of T
and denoted by r(T ), having no predecessors in T and there is a unique directed
coalitional path in T from r(T ) to every other member of the partition.
3 Average coalitional tree solution
For a coalitional game (v,F) ∈ GN , we assume that the grand coalition N is always
a feasible coalition and is therefore an element of the coalitional structure F . There
are no other restrictions imposed on the set system F of feasible coalitions. The
idea is that the grand coalition N will form and the problem is how to distribute
its worth v(N) among the agents. As solution concept, we propose to take the
average of the marginal contribution vectors induced by all maximal nested sets of
the set system representing the coalitional structure. Nested sets of a set system
are introduced by Postnikov (2005).
Definition 3.1 Given a coalitional structure F on N , a subset X of F is a nested
set of F if it satisfies the following conditions:
(i) For any two different X1, X2 ∈ X it holds that either X1 ⊂ X2 or X2 ⊂ X1 or
X1 ∩X2 = ∅;
(ii) For any collection of h, h ≥ 2, disjoint nonempty subsets X1,. . . ,Xh in X it
holds that X1 ∪ · · · ∪Xh /∈ F ;
(iii) N ∈ X .
A nested set of a coalitional structure is a collection of feasible coalitions, in-
cluding the set of all players, such that for any two different members either one of
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them is a subset of the other one or they are disjoint, and, moreover, the union of
two or more disjoint members is not a feasible coalition. Notice that every chain of
a coalitional structure F is a nested set of F , where Y is a chain of F if N ∈ Y and
for any two different Y1, Y2 ∈ Y it holds that either Y1 ⊂ Y2 or Y2 ⊂ Y1.
A nested set X of a coalitional structure F is maximal if there does not exist any
other nested set X ′ of F that contains X . A maximal nested set defines a unique
way to build the grand coalition by letting one or simultaneously several players
join to one or more feasible coalitions to form bigger feasible coalitions, starting
from disjoint minimal (by set inclusion) coalitions in the set system. Notice that a
maximal chain is not necessarily a maximal nested set and that a maximal nested
set may not be a maximal chain. If a maximal chain is not a maximal nested set,
then there exists a maximal nested set that contains the chain as a proper subset.
Example 3.1 Consider the coalitional structure F = {{1}, {1, 2}, {2, 3}, {1, 2, 3, 4}}
on N = {1, 2, 3, 4}. This set system has two maximal nested sets, X 1 = {{1},
{1, 2}, {1, 2, 3, 4}} and X 2 = {{1}, {2, 3}, {1, 2, 3, 4}}. In X 1, player 2 joins feasible
singleton player 1 to form feasible coalition {1, 2} and players 3 and 4 join simul-
taneously the latter coalition to form the grand coalition. In X 2, player 4 joins to
both feasible singleton player 1 and minimal feasible coalition {2, 3} to form im-
mediately the grand coalition. The two feasible coalitions {1, 2} and {2, 3} cannot
be members of a same maximal nested set because one is not a subset of the other
and their intersection is nonempty. On the other hand, the two disjoint feasible
coalitions {1} and {2, 3} can be members of the same maximal nested set, because
their union, {1, 2, 3}, is not a feasible coalition. The maximal nested set X 1 is also a
maximal chain, but X 2 is not. On the other hand, {{2, 3}, {1, 2, 3, 4}} is a maximal
chain that is not a maximal nested set, because it is a proper subset of X 1.
Any coalitional structure on N contains at least one maximal nested set. To
see this, note that N itself is a nested set, which does not need to be maximal. If
it is not a maximal nested set, then we can include any other feasible coalition. If
this new collection of two feasible coalitions is again not maximal, we continue with
including feasible coalitions which do not violate the definition of a nested set, and
so on. Because the number of feasible coalitions is finite, at some point we end up
with a maximal nested set. This argument also shows that every feasible coalition
is member of at least one maximal nested set.
For a coalitional structure F on N , XF denotes the collection of maximal nested
sets of F . Notice that in case the coalitional structure F contains all subsets of N ,
i.e., F = 2N , then the number of maximal nested sets is maximal and equal to n!
and all maximal nested sets are maximal chains.
Given a coalitional structure F on N , for a nested set X of F and i ∈ N , the
set MX (i) denotes the unique minimal element of X that contains player i. Notice
that due to conditions (i) and (iii) of Definition 3.1 this set is well defined.
Lemma 3.1 For any maximal nested set X ∈ XF of a coalitional structure F on
N , it holds that for every X ∈ X there exists i ∈ N such that MX (i) = X.
Proof. Suppose there exists a feasible coalition X ∈ X for which there is no i ∈ N
with MX (i) = X. Since X is a maximal nested set and MX (i) 6= X for all i ∈ X, it
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holds that MX (i) ⊂ X, MX (i) ∈ X and i ∈ MX (i) for all i ∈ X. Since MX (i) ∈ X
for all i ∈ X, there exist i1, . . . , ik ∈ X such that MX (i1), . . . ,MX (ik) are disjoint
and ∪kh=1MX (ih) = X. Since X is a feasible coalition this violates condition (ii) of
Definition 3.1.
Example 3.2 Consider the coalitional structure F = {{1, 2}, {3}, {2, 3, 4}, {1, 2, 3,
4, 5}} on {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. It has two maximal nested sets, X 1 = {{1, 2}, {3}, {1, 2, 3, 4,
5}} and X 2 = {{3}, {2, 3, 4}, {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}}. For these maximal nested sets we have
MX 1(1) = MX 1(2) = {1, 2}, MX 1(3) = {3}, MX 1(4) = MX 1(5) = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, and
MX 2(1) = MX 2(5) = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, MX 2(2) = MX 2(4) = {2, 3, 4}, MX 2(3) = {3}.
In the example we see that, for two distinct players the minimal elements of a
maximal nested set that contain these players can be the same.
Definition 3.2 For a collection S of subsets of N , two players i, j ∈ N are equiva-
lent with respect to S if {S ∈ S | i ∈ S} = {S ∈ S | j ∈ S}.
For a collection S of subsets of N and i ∈ N , PS(i) denotes the set of equivalent
players of i with respect to S. Note that i ∈ PS(i) holds for all i ∈ N, which means
that each player is equivalent to himself. Moreover, if {i} ∈ S for some i ∈ N , then
there exists no other player which is equivalent to player i, and so PS(i) = {i}.
Remark 3.1 Given a coalitional structure F on N , for a maximal nested set X ∈
XF , two players i, j ∈ N are equivalent with respect to X if and only if MX (i) =
MX (j).
Remark 3.2 For a coalitional structure F on N , if two players i, j ∈ N are equiv-
alent with respect to F , then i and j are equivalent with respect to every maximal
nested set in XF .
Remark 3.1 follows from condition (i) of Definition 3.1. Remark 3.2 is an imme-
diate result of the fact that each maximal nested set is a subset of the set system
representing the coalitional structure.
A maximal nested set X ∈ XF of a coalitional structure F on N induces a
partition PX of N into sets of equivalent players with respect to X , with PX (i) the
partition member containing the equivalent players of player i ∈ N . For P ∈ PX ,
since P is a set of equivalent players with respect to X , it holds that MX (i) = MX (j)
for all i, j ∈ P . We denote MX (P ) to be the set MX (i) for any i ∈ P, P ∈ PX .
Given a maximal nested set X of a coalitional structure F on N and the corre-
sponding partition PX , the coalitional digraph (PX , TX ) is given by (P1, P2) ∈ TX
if MX (P1) ⊃ MX (P2) and there exists no X ∈ X with MX (P1) ⊃ X ⊃ MX (P2).
The next theorem shows that this coalitional digraph is a coalitional tree.
Theorem 3.1 For any maximal nested set X ∈ XF of a coalitional structure F
on N , the coalitional digraph (PX , TX ) is a coalitional tree satisfying the following
properties:
(i) Its coalitional root r(TX ) is equal to {i ∈ N |MX (i) = N};
(ii) For any P ∈ PX it holds that STX (P ) = MX (P );
(iii) For any P ∈ PX it holds that {STX (P ′) | (P, P ′) ∈ TX } is the unique maximal
partition of STX (P ) = MX (P ) \ P into elements of X .
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Proof. To show that (PX , TX ) is a coalitional tree we need to prove the uniqueness
of a coalitional root and the uniqueness of a directed coalitional path in the tree
from the coalitional root to any other member of PX . By Lemma 3.1 the set R =
{i ∈ N |MX (i) = N} is nonempty and consists of equivalent players with respect to
X . Hence, R ∈ PX . Since there exists no P ∈ PX with MX (P ) ⊃ MX (R) = N, it
holds that R has no predecessor in TX . Since X is a maximal nested set there exists
a unique directed path in TX from R to any other member of PX . This implies that
(PX , TX ) is a coalitional tree with the coalitional root being the set R, which also
proves property (i).
Property (ii) is shown by induction. Take any P ∈ PX without successor in
(PX , TX ), then STX (P ) = P and P ⊆MX (P ). Suppose there exists i ∈MX (P )\P,
then i is not equivalent to the players in P with respect to X and therefore MX (i) ⊂
MX (P ). This implies the existence of a directed coalitional path in T
X from P to
PX (i), which contradicts that P has no successors. Next, we show STX (P ) = MX (P )
if STX (P
′) = MX (P
′) for all P ′ satisfying (P, P ′) ∈ TX . Let P1 . . . , Pk be the
collection of immediate successors of P in TX , then MX (P ) ⊃ MX (Pi) = STX (Pi)
for all i = 1, . . . , k. Since STX (P ) = (∪i=ki=1STX (Pi)) ∪ P and P ⊆ MX (P ), this
implies MX (P ) ⊇ STX (P ). Suppose j ∈MX (P )\STX (P ). Since j is not equivalent
to the players in P with respect to X and j ∈ MX (P ), we have MX (j) ⊂ MX (P ).
This implies the existence of a directed coalitional path in TX from P to PX (j),
which contradicts that j /∈ STX (P ).
To show property (iii) let P1, . . . , Pk be the collection of immediate successors
of P ∈ PX in TX . Condition (ii) implies that STX (P ) = MX (P ) and STX (Pj) =
MX (Pj) for all j = 1 . . . , k. Hence, MX (P ) \ P = STX (P ) \ P = STX (P ) =
∪kj=1STX (Pj) = ∪kj=1MX (Pj). Since X is a maximal nested set, MX (Pj)∩MX (Ph) =
∅ for all j 6= h, and MX (Pj) ∈ X for j = 1, . . . , k, this implies that {STX (P1), . . . ,
STX (Pk)} is the unique maximal partition of STX (P ) = MX (P ) \ P into members
of X .
A coalitional tree on a set of players N that is induced by a maximal nested set
may be seen as a generalization of a tree on N in which the nodes of the tree are
coalitions of equivalent players with respect to the maximal nested set instead of
individual players.
Since each maximal nested set X of a coalitional structure F on N contains the
grand coalition N and by applying Lemma 3.1, there exist players for which the
grand coalition is the minimal set in X containing them. According to property (i)
the root of the coalitional tree TX induced by X precisely consists of these players.
So, if a maximal nested set is considered as a way to build the grand coalition,
the root of the induced coalitional tree is the final set of equivalent players that
simultaneously join after all other sets of equivalent players have joined. Accord-
ing to property (ii), the players at a node of TX together with the players in all
succeeding nodes is the minimal set in X that contains any player at that node. A
direct implication of this property is that the union of the successors of any partition
member P ∈ PX together with the elements of P is a member of the set system F ,
and hence is a feasible coalition. Property (iii) says that for each member X of a
maximal nested set, it holds that if we delete from X all players for which X is the
minimal set containing them, then there is a unique maximal partition of the set of
remaining players in X into members of the maximal nested set.
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Example 3.3 Consider the coalitional structures F = {{1}, {2, 3}, {1, 2, 3}} and
F ′ = {{1}, {2}, {2, 3}, {1, 2, 3}} on N = {1, 2, 3}. Both F and F ′ contain two
maximal nested sets, X 1 = {{1}, {1, 2, 3}} and X 2 = {{2, 3}, {1, 2, 3}} for F , and
Y1 = {{1}, {2}, {1, 2, 3}} and Y2 = {{2}, {2, 3}, {1, 2, 3}} for F ′. For the parti-
tions induced by these maximal nested sets we have PX 1 = {{1}, {2, 3}}, PX 2 =
{{2, 3}, {1}} and PY1 = {{1}, {2}, {3}}, PY2 = {{2}, {3}, {1}}. The coalitional
trees on these partitions are equal to TX
1
= {({2, 3}, {1})}, TX 2 = {({1}, {2, 3})}
and TY
1
= {({3}, {1}), ({3}, {2})}, TY2 = {({1}, {3}), ({3}, {2})}. Note that
MX 1({1}) = {1} and MX 1({2, 3}) = {1, 2, 3}. Since MX 1({1}) ⊂ MX 1({2, 3})
we have ({2, 3}, {1}) ∈ TX 1 . Similarly for X 2, we have MX 2({1}) = {1, 2, 3} and
MX 2({2, 3}) = {2, 3} which means MX 2({2, 3}) ⊂MX 2({1}). Hence, ({1}, {2, 3}) ∈
TX
2
. The graphical representation of these coalitional trees is depicted in Figure
1. The root of TX
1
is {2, 3} with succeeding set S
TX1 ({2, 3}) = {1}, whereas {1}
is the root of TX
2
with succeeding set S
TX2 ({1}) = {2, 3}. In T
Y1 the set {3}
is the root and the sets S
TY1 ({1}) = {1} and STY1 ({2}) = {2} partition the set
S




has {1} as root and feasible coalition S
TY2 ({1}) = {2, 3} is the
only succeeding set of the root. Since both {2} and {2, 3} are feasible coalitions
in F ′ but {3} is not, only {3} can be an immediate successor of {1} and therefore
S


















Figure 1: The coalitional trees of F and F ′ in Example 3.3.
The following example shows that the sets of equivalent players may differ in different
coalitional trees of the same set system.
Example 3.4 Consider the coalitional structure F = {{3}, {8}, {1, 2}, {1, 8}, {2, 3,
4, 5}, {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, N} on N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8}. F contains two maximal nested
sets, X 1 = {{1, 2}, {3}, {8}, {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8}} and X 2 = {{3}, {1, 8},
{2, 3, 4, 5}, {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8}}. For the maximal nested set X 1, we have MX 1(1) =
MX 1(2) = {1, 2}, MX 1(3) = {3}, MX 1(4) = MX 1(5) = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, MX 1(6) =
MX 1(7) = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8}, MX 1(8) = {8}, and for the maximal nested set X 2,
we have MX 2(1) = MX 2(8) = {1, 8}, MX 2(2) = MX 2(4) = MX 2(5) = {2, 3, 4, 5},
MX 2(3) = {3}, MX 2(6) = MX 2(7) = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8}. In X 1, player 1 is equiv-
alent to player 2, player 4 is equivalent to player 5, and player 6 is equivalent to
player 7. However, in X 2, player 1 is equivalent to player 8, player 6 is equivalent to
8
player 7, and players 2, 4, 5 are equivalent to each other. For the induced partitions
of equivalent players we have PX 1 = {{1, 2}, {3}, {8}, {4, 5}, {6, 7}} and PX 2 =





is depicted in Figure 2. Coalition S
TX1 ({6, 7}) =
{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8} is partitioned into feasible coalitions S
TX1 ({4, 5}) = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} and
S
TX1 ({8}) = {8}, and STX1 ({4, 5}) = {1, 2, 3} is partitioned into feasible coalitions
S
TX1 ({1, 2}) = {1, 2} and STX1 ({3}) = {3}. Similarly, coalition STX2 ({6, 7}) =
{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8} is partitioned into feasible coalitions S
TX2 ({2, 4, 5}) = {2, 3, 4, 5}
and S














Given a coalitional game (v,F) ∈ GN on the set of players N , we define for every












, i ∈ N.
For a marginal vector corresponding to the coalitional tree induced by a maximal
nested set, each set of equivalent players receives as total payoff the marginal contri-
bution when these players simultaneously join to the players in the sets of successors
in the tree. The total payoff available for a set of equivalent players is distributed
equally among the players of the set. The intuition behind this marginal vector is
as follows. Given a maximal nested set and the corresponding coalitional tree, each
set of equivalent players is the smallest set that can join to its set of successors to
form a bigger feasible coalition. So, each set of equivalent players should receive
its marginal contribution when joining to its successors. On the individual level,
since all members of a set of equivalent players join simultaneously, this marginal
contribution is equally divided among them. Every maximal nested set of the under-
lying coalitional structure of the game is as likely to occur. This gives the following
definition of a solution.
Definition 3.3 For a coalitional game (v,F) ∈ GN , the average coalitional tree
solution is the payoff vector ACT (v,F) given by






The average coalitional tree solution of a coalitional game is the average of
the marginal vectors that corrspond to the coalitional trees induced by all maximal
nested sets of the coalitional structure. Like the Shapley value, the solution considers
for each player his marginal contributions. However, for some players it may not
be possible to join a feasible coalition individually in order to form a larger feasible
coalition. To illustrate such a case, consider the coalitional structure F given in
Example 3.3. For this coalitional structure, there exists no feasible coalition to
which player 2 can join, make it a larger feasible coalition and receive his own
marginal contribution. However, together with player 3, player 2 is able to join to
the feasible coalition consisting of singleton player 1. This contribution is realized in
the coalitional tree TX
1
of the example. The joint marginal contribution of players
2 and 3 while joining to singleton player 1 is divided equally among the two players.
Example 3.5 Consider a coalitional game (v,F) where the coalitional structure F
is the one given in Example 3.4. For the characteristic function v : 2N → R, let










2 = (v({1, 2}) − v(∅))/2 = v({1, 2})/2 = 2, mX
1










(v(N)− v({1, 2, 3, 4, 5})− v({8}))/2 = 19, mX 18 = v({8})− v(∅) = 1, and so mX
1
=




(v,F) it holds that mX 21 =
mX
2






5 = (v({2, 3, 4, 5})−v({3}))/3 =
5, mX
2




7 = (v(N)−v({2, 3, 4, 5})−v({1, 8}))/2 = 22,
and so mX
2
= (2, 5, 1, 5, 5, 22, 22, 2)>. The average coalitional tree solution of the




(2, 7/2, 1, 15/2, 15/2, 41/2, 41/2, 3/2)>.
We remark that the average coalitional tree solution is defined for cooperative
games with completely arbitrary coalitional structure. The only assumption be-
ing made is that the grand coalition can be formed. In Section 5 special cases of
coalitional structures are considered.
4 Properties of the average coalitional tree solution
In this section we provide some properties that are satisfied by the average coalitional
tree solution. Let GN be again the set of coalitional games on the player set N =
{1, . . . , n}. Recall that we assume the grand coalitionN is always a feasible coalition.
4.1 Efficiency
For a coalitional game (v,F) ∈ GN , a payoff vector x ∈ IRN is efficient if x distributes
the worth v(N) of the grand coalition, i.e. x(N) = v(N). A value ξ on GN is efficient
if for any coalitional game (v,F) ∈ GN the payoff vector ξ(v,F) is efficient.
Proposition 4.1 The average coalitional tree solution is efficient.
Proof. For a given coalitional game (v,F) in GN , the average coalitional tree solu-
tion is equal to the average of the marginal vectors corresponding to the coalitional
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trees induced by all maximal nested sets of F . Since each marginal vector distributes
the worth v(N) of N over all players, the efficiency of the average coalitional tree
solution follows.
4.2 Linearity
A value ξ on GN satisfies linearity if for any two coalitional games (v,F) and (w,F)
in GN it holds that for any a, b ∈ IR,
ξ(av + bw,F) = aξ(v,F) + bξ(w,F),
where the characteristic function av+bw is defined as (av+bw)(S) = av(S)+bw(S)
for all S ∈ F .
Proposition 4.2 The average coalitional tree solution satisfies linearity.
Proof. Given two coalitional games (v,F) and (w,F) in GN and real numbers
a, b ∈ IR, since the coalitional structure is represented by F for (v,F), (w,F) and
(av + bw,F), the collection of maximal nested sets is the same for each of these
three coalitional games. Since the ACT solution of a coalitional game is a linear
combination of the marginal vectors induced by all maximal nested sets, the ACT
solution satisfies linearity.
4.3 Equal treatment of equivalent players
For a coalitional game (v,F) ∈ GN , two players i, j ∈ N are equivalent if they are
equivalent with respect to F . A value ξ on the class of coalitional games satisfies the
equal treatment of equivalent players property if for any coalitional game (v,F) ∈ GN
it holds that ξi(v,F) = ξj(v,F) whenever i ∈ N and j ∈ N are equivalent players
for the game (v,F). The intuition behind this property is that since equivalent
players for a coalitional game always join simultaneously to the same sets, these
players should receive the payoff.
Proposition 4.3 The average coalitional tree solution satisfies the equal treatment
of equivalent players property.
Proof. Take any coalitional game (v,F) ∈ GN , maximal nested set X ∈ X
F
and
two players i, j ∈ N being for (v,F). Let (PX , TX ) be the coalitional tree induced
by X . According to Remark 3.2, players i and j are equivalent also with respect to
X . This implies the existence of P ∈ PX such that i, j ∈ P . Hence,


















it implies that ACTi(v,F) = ACTj(v,F).
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4.4 Null player property
For TU games, since any subset of players is feasible, a player is able to join any
subset of players he doesn’t belong to. For such games, a null player is defined to
be a player whose marginal contribution is zero when joining to any set of players.
For our setting, since not all coalitions are feasible, a player may not be able to
join all coalitions. Moreover, a player may need other players to be able to join to
a feasible coalition and also we may have cases where players are not joining to a
single feasible coalition but to several disjoint feasible coalitions.
Definition 4.1 Given a coalitional structure F on N and S ∈ F , {S1, . . . , Sk} is a
maximal subpartition of S if it satisfies the following conditions:




(ii) Sh ∈ F and Sh ∩ Sm = ∅ holds for all distinct h,m ∈ {1, . . . , k};
(iii) S′ ∪ (
⋃
m∈M
Sm) /∈ F for all S′ ⊆ (S \
k⋃
h=1
Sh) and M ⊆ {1, . . . , k}.
For a feasible coalition S ∈ F , a collection of disjoint feasible coalitions S1, . . . Sk
is a maximal subpartition of S if their union is a proper subset of S and it is not
possible to find any other such collection that is obtained by combining some of the
members of the collection with some other players in S. A maximal subpartition
of a feasible coalition S does not need to be unique and is the empty set if there
exists no S′ ∈ F such that S′ ⊂ S. For S ∈ F , DF (S) denotes the collection of
maximal subpartitions of S. Note that if the empty set is a maximal subpartition
of a feasible coalition S, then there exists no other maximal subpartitions of S.
Example 4.1 Consider the coalitional structure F = {{1}, {2}, {2, 3}, {4, 5}, {1, 2,
3, 4, 5}} on N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. For the grand coalition N there exist three max-
imal subpartitions, {{1}, {2, 3}}, {{1}, {4, 5}}, and {{2, 3}, {4, 5}}. Furthermore,
DF ({2, 3}) = {{{2}}} and DF ({4, 5}) = ∅.








A player is a null player if the contribution is zero when he and possibly other
players join to a maximal subpartition of a feasible coalition he belongs to. Notice
that if a player i ∈ N is a null player and {i} ∈ F , then v({i}) = 0.
A value ξ on the class of coalitional games satisfies the null player property if
for any coalitional game (v,F) ∈ GN it holds that ξi(v,F) = 0 whenever i ∈ N is a
null player for (v,F).
Proposition 4.4 The average coalitional tree solution satisfies the null player prop-
erty.
Proof. Take any coalitional game (v,F) ∈ GN and i ∈ N such that player i is a null
player for (v,F). Consider any maximal nested set X ∈ XF and let PX (i) = P . By
property (iii) of Theorem 3.1, {STX (P ′) | P ′ ∈ ITX (P )} is a maximal subpartition
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of STX (P ) not containing i. Since i is a null player for (v,F) and STX (Q) = MX (Q)

























Since the ACT solution is the average of the marginal vectors corresponding to the
coalitional trees induced by all maximal nested sets of F , it holds that ACTi(v,F) =
0.
4.5 Independence of closed coalitions
If a feasible coalition of a coalitional structure is disjoint to any other feasible coali-
tion that does not contain it or is not a subset of it and if no subset of it is able to
join other feasible coalitions to form a larger feasible coalition, then this coalition is
called a closed coalition.
Definition 4.3 Given a coalitional structure F on N , a feasible coalition Q ∈ F is
a closed coalition if it satisfies the following conditions:
(i) For all S ∈ F , S 6= Q, either Q ⊂ S or Q ⊃ S or Q ∩ S = ∅;




Sj) ∪Q′ /∈ F .
Subsets of a closed coalition are not able to contribute to the coalitions that also
contain players outside the coalition. Because of this property, the members of a
closed coalition should receive together just the worth of that coalition, the payoffs
of players inside the closed coalition should only depend on the worths of the feasible
subcoalitions of the closed coalition, and the payoffs of players outside the closed
coalition should be independent of these worths.
Definition 4.4 A value ξ on the class of coalitional games satisfies independence of
closed coalitions if for any coalitional game (v,F) ∈ GN and closed coalition Q ∈ F
the following conditions hold:
(i)
∑
i∈Q ξi(v,F) = v(Q);
(ii) For any coalitional game (w,F) ∈ GN such that w(S) = v(S) for all S ∈ F
satisfying S ⊆ Q, it holds that ξi(v,F) = ξi(w,F) for all i ∈ Q;
(iii) For any coalitional game (w,F) ∈ GN such that w(S) = v(S) for all S ∈ F
satisfying S ⊇ Q or S ∩Q = ∅, it holds that ξi(v,F) = ξi(w,F) for all i ∈ N \Q.
Proposition 4.5 The average coalitional tree solution satisfies independence of
closed coalitions.
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Proof. Take any coalitional game (v,F) ∈ GN and closed coalition Q ∈ F . We
first show that Q ∈ X for all X ∈ XF . Suppose there exists a maximal nested set
X ∈ XF such that Q /∈ X . Since Q is a closed coalition and X ⊆ F , conditions (i)
and (ii) of Definition 4.3 imply that X ∪{Q} is a nested set, which contradicts that
X is a maximal nested set.
To prove condition (i) of Definition 4.4 take any X ∈ XF . By Lemma 3.1 and
Theorem 3.1, there exists P ∈ PX such that MX (P ) = STX (P ) = Q. This implies∑
i∈Qm
X
i (v,F) = v(MX (P )) = v(Q). Since the ACT solution is the average of
the marginal vectors corresponding to the coalitional trees induced by all maximal
nested sets, we have
∑
i∈QACTi(v,F) = v(Q).
To show condition (ii) of Definition 4.4, take any i ∈ Q and coalitional game
(w,F) such that w(S) = v(S) for all S ∈ F satisfying S ⊆ Q. Both coalitional
games (v,F) and (w,F) have the same coalitional structure F and Q ∈ X for all























Q ∈ X and i ∈ Q imply both MX (i) ⊆ Q and MX (P ) ⊆ Q for all P ∈ ITX (PX (i)).
Since v(S) = w(S) for all S ⊆ Q we obtain v(MX (i)) = w(MX (i)) and v(MX (P )) =
w(MX (P )) for all P ∈ ITX (PX (i)). Hence, mXi (v,F) = mXi (w,F) for all X ∈ X
F
and therefore ACTi(v,F) = ACTi(w,F).
To show condition (iii) of Definition 4.4, take any i ∈ N \Q and coalitional game
(w,F) ∈ GN such that w(S) = v(S) for all S ∈ F satisfying S ⊇ Q or S ∩ Q = ∅.
Again both coalitional games (v,F) and (w,F) have the same coalitional structure
F and Q ∈ X for all X ∈ XF . Take any X ∈ XF . Since Q ∈ X is a closed
coalition and i ∈ N \ Q, either MX (i) ∩ Q = ∅ or MX (i) ⊃ Q. If MX (i) ∩ Q = ∅
then MX (P ) ∩Q = ∅ for all P ∈ ITX (PX (i)), which implies v(MX (i)) = w(MX (i))
and v(MX (P )) = w(MX (P )) for all P ∈ ITX (PX (i)) and therefore mXi (v,F) =
mXi (w,F). If MX (i) ⊃ Q, then MX (P ′) ⊇ Q for precisely one P ′ ∈ ITX (PX (i)) and
MX (P ) ∩ Q = ∅ for all other P ∈ ITX (PX (i)). Since v(S) = w(S) for all S ⊇ Q
or S ∩ Q = ∅, this implies v(MX (i)) = w(MX (i)) and v(MX (P )) = w(MX (P )) for
all P ∈ ITX (PX (i)) and therefore mXi (v,F) = mXi (w,F). The two cases together
imply that ACTi(v,F) = ACTi(w,F).
Since we assume N ∈ F , the grand coalition N is a closed coalition. Hence,
efficiency of the ACT solution also follows from independence of closed coalitions,
condition (i) of Definition 4.4. For a coalitional game, a closed coalition can be seen
as a set of players whose performance is not affected by the other players of the
game (condition (ii)) and also does not affect the performance of the other players
(condition (iii)). Condition (ii) implies also that the ACT solution of the subgame
obtained by the players of a closed coalition is the the same as the ACT solution
for these players under the original game.
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For the solution concept introduced in Aguilera et al. (2010), the property of
independence of closed coalitions is not satisfied, because a closed coalition may not
be a member of every maximal chain of the coalitional structure.
Example 4.2 Consider the coalitional structure F = {{1, 2}, {2, 3}, {1, 2, 3}, {4, 6},
{5, 7}, {6, 7}, {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, {1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 8}, N} on N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8}. F con-
tains six maximal nested sets, X 1 = {{1, 2}, {1, 2, 3}, {5, 7}, {1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 8}, N},
X 2 = {{2, 3}, {1, 2, 3}, {5, 7}, {1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 8}, N}, X 3 = {{1, 2}, {1, 2, 3}, {6, 7}, {1, 2,
3, 4, 5}, N}, X 4 = {{2, 3}, {1, 2, 3}, {6, 7}, {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, N}, X 5 = {{1, 2}, {1, 2, 3},
{4, 6}, {5, 7}, N}, and X 6 = {{2, 3}, {1, 2, 3}, {4, 6}, {5, 7}, N}. The corresponding





































Coalition {1, 2, 3} is a closed coalition and is in each coalitional tree a branch of
the tree. For each of the six maximal nested sets the total payoff for the members of
the coalition {1, 2, 3} at the induced marginal vector is equal to its worth v({1, 2, 3}).
If for two coalitional games (v,F) and (w,F) it holds that v(S) = w(S) for all
feasible S ⊆ {1, 2, 3}, then at the ACT solution the payoffs for the players in {1, 2, 3}
are the same. Similarly, if v(S) = w(S) holds for all feasible S satisfying S ∩
{1, 2, 3} = ∅ or S ⊇ {1, 2, 3}, then at the ACT solution the payoffs for the players
in {4, 5, 6, 7, 8} are the same. Notice that {{5, 7}, {1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 8}, N} is a maximal
chain that does not contain the closed coalition {1, 2, 3}.
5 Special cases
Like for the ACT solution, in Koshevoy and Talman (2011) maximal nested sets
are used as the main tool to define the GC solution for games with coalitional
structures that are called building sets. A set system on N is a building set if
all singleton coalitions and the union of all intersecting feasible coalitions are also
feasible. Koshevoy and Talman (2011) also propose a way to use the GC solution for
games with arbitrary coalitional structure by taking its building cover. Given a set
system F on N , the building cover of F , B(F), is defined as the smallest building
set on N that contains F . For a coalitional game (v,F) on N , by using the Möbius
inversion, they define the so called M-extension vF of the characteristic function v
and propose as GC solution of (v,F) the GC solution of the game (vF ,B(F)). For a
coalitional game (v,F) where F is a building set, the ACT solution and GC solution
coincide. For games with more general coalitional structure the ACT solution differs
from the GC solution.
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Example 5.1 Consider the coalitional game (v,F) with coalitional structure F =
{{2, 4}, {3, 4}, {1, 2, 3, 4}} and v(S) = |S|2 for all S ∈ F . F has two maximal
nested sets, X 1 = {{2, 4}, {1, 2, 3, 4}} and X 2 = {{3, 4}, {1, 2, 3, 4}}, with cor-
responding coalitional trees depicted in Figure 4a. Since F contains no single-
ton coalitions and also not the union {2, 3, 4} of the feasible coalitions {2, 4} and
{3, 4}, F is not a building set. The building cover of F is the collection B(F) =
{{1}, {2}, {3}, {4}, {2, 4}, {3, 4}, {2, 3, 4}, {1, 2, 3, 4}}, having ten maximal nested
sets, Y1 = {{4}, {3, 4}, {2, 3, 4}, {1, 2, 3, 4}}, Y2 = {{3}, {3, 4}, {2, 3, 4}, {1, 2, 3, 4}},
Y3 = {{4}, {2, 4}, {2, 3, 4}, {1, 2, 3, 4}}, Y4 = {{2}, {2, 4}, {2, 3, 4}, {1, 2, 3, 4}}, Y5 =
{{2}, {3}, {2, 3, 4}, {1, 2, 3, 4}}, Y6 = {{1}, {4}, {3, 4}, {1, 2, 3, 4}}, Y7 = {{1}, {3},
{3, 4}, {1, 2, 3, 4}}, Y8 = {{1}, {4}, {2, 4}, {1, 2, 3, 4}}, Y9 = {{1}, {2}, {2, 4}, {1, 2, 3,
4}}, Y10 = {{1}, {2}, {3}, {1, 2, 3, 4}}, with corresponding coalitional trees depicted
in Figure 4b.









Figure 4: Example 5.1.






















































For the M-extension of v, vF , we obtain vF (S) = v(S) if S ∈ F , vF (S) = 0 if
|S| = 1, and vF ({2, 3, 4}) = v({2, 4}) + v({3, 4}) = 8. It holds that ACT (v,F) =
(6, 4, 4, 2)> and GC(v,F) = GC(vF ,B(F)) = (4, 4, 4, 4)>. Notice that some of the
marginal vectors that correspond to the coalitional trees of the building cover B(F)
are the same.
In the next subsections we discuss some special cases of coalitional games. Since
some of these cases, like complete coalitional structures and graphical coalitional
structures, are also building sets, the ACT solution and GC solution give the same
outcome for these cases.
5.1 Complete coalitional structures
A coalitional structure F on a set of players N is complete if F = 2N where N is the
set of all players. For a coalitional game (v,F) ∈ GN , if F is complete, all coalitions
are feasible, which means that v is a TU game.
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Lemma 5.1 Given a complete coalitional structure F on N , for any maximal nested
set X ∈ XF and S, Q ∈ X it holds that S ⊆ Q or Q ⊆ S.
Proof. Suppose there exists a maximal nested set X ∈ XF and distinct S, Q ∈ X
with S ∩Q = ∅. Since F is complete, it holds that S ∪Q ∈ F . But this contradicts
with condition (ii) of Definition 3.1. Since X is a maximal nested set and we can
rule out the case S ∩Q = ∅ for distinct members S and Q, we end up with S ⊆ Q
or Q ⊆ S for all S, Q ∈ X .
Lemma 5.2 Given a complete coalitional structure F on N , for any maximal nested
set X ∈ XF and S ∈ X with |S| ≥ 2, it holds that there exists i ∈ S such that
S \ {i} ∈ X .
Proof. Take any X ∈ XF and S ∈ X with |S| ≥ 2. Let Q ∈ X be a maximal
proper subset of S in X , i.e., either Q = ∅ or Q ∈ X , Q ⊂ S and there exists no
Q′ ∈ X with S ⊃ Q′ ⊃ Q. Suppose |S \Q| ≥ 2. So there exists i, j ∈ S \Q, i 6= j.
Then Q ⊂ Q ∪ {i} ⊂ S and Q ∪ {i} /∈ X . Since F is complete, Q ∪ {i} ∈ F , which
contradicts that X is a maximal nested set of F .
Remark 5.1 For a complete coalitional structure F on N , every maximal nested
set is a maximal chain and |XF | = n!.
Remark 5.1 is an immediate result of Lemma 5.1 and Lemma 5.2. To form a maximal
nested set, first we can include the grand coalition. By Lemma 5.2 we should also
include a subset of the grand coalition with cardinality one less. The number of
possibilities is n for this step. At the next step we will have n−1 possibilities and so
on. Hence, in total there are n! possibilities, each of which corresponds to a maximal
nested set being also a maximal chain.
For TU games, the Shapley value is the best known single-valued solution con-
cept, see Shapley (1953). To find the Shapley value, all permutations over the
players are considered and a marginal vector is associated to each permutation, at
which each player receives his marginal contribution when joining to his set of suc-
cessors in the permutation. The Shapley value is the average of all these marginal
vectors. Clearly, these permutations correspond one-to-one to the set of maximal
nested sets. Let Sh(v) stand for the Shapley value of a TU game v.
Corollary 5.1 For a coalitional game (v,F) ∈ GN with complete coalitional struc-
ture F on N , it holds that ACT (v,F) = Sh(v).
5.2 Graphical coalitional structures
A graph on N consists of a set of nodes, being the elements of N , and a collection
of unordered pairs of nodes L ⊆ LcN , where LcN = { {i, j} | i, j ∈ N, i 6= j} is
the complete graph without loops on N and an unordered pair {i, j} ∈ L is a link
between i and j. For a graph L on N , a sequence of different nodes (i1, . . . , ik), k ≥ 2,
is a path in L between node i1 and node ik if {ih, ih+1} ∈ L for h = 1, . . . , k − 1.
A coalition S ∈ 2N is a network if S is connected, i.e., for any two different players
i, j ∈ S there is a path in L of nodes in S between i and j. For S ∈ 2N , a network
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Q ⊆ S is a component of S in L if Q cannot form a larger network with any i ∈ S\Q.
For S ∈ 2N , KL(S) denotes the collection of networks in L that are subsets of S
and K̂L(S) denotes the collection of components of S in L.
A coalitional structure F on N is graphical, if F is the collection of all connected
sets of players of a graph L on N , i.e., F = KL(N). In order to have the grand
coalition N as a feasible set, throughout this subsection, we assume that N forms
a network in the graph that induces the coalitional structure. In case the set of
feasible coalitions is restricted to the collection of sets of connected players of an
undirected graph defined on N , the coalitional game is called a graph game, see
Myerson (1977).
Lemma 5.3 Given a graphical coalitional structure F on N , for any maximal
nested set X ∈ XF it holds that PX (i) = {i} for all i ∈ N .
Proof. Let the graphical coalitional structure F on N be induced by a graph L
on N and take any X ∈ XF . Suppose there exists i ∈ N for which j ∈ PX (i), for
some j 6= i. Then MX (i) = MX (j). Let K ∈ K̂L(MX (i) \ {i}) be the component of
MX (i) \ {i} in L containing j. Then K ∈ F and K 6∈ X . Since L is a graph on N ,
X ∪ {K} is a nested set, contradicting that X is a maximal nested set.
An immediate result of Lemma 5.3 is that, if the coalitional structure of a coali-
tional game is graphical then all coalitional trees corresponding to the maximal
nested sets are trees.
Lemma 5.4 Given a graphical coalitional structure F on N induced by a graph L
on N , for any X ∈ XF it holds that STX (P ′) ∈ K̂L(STX (P )) if (P, P ′) ∈ TX .
Proof. Take any X ∈ XF and let (P, P ′) ∈ TX . As a direct result of Theorem
3.1 and since F = KL(N), we have STX (P ) ∈ KL(N) and STX (P ′) ∈ KL(N).
Let S1 . . . , Sk be the components of STX (P ) in L, i.e., Si ∈ K̂L(STX (P )) holds
for all i = 1, . . . , k. First, suppose STX (P
′) ⊂ Sh for some h ∈ {1, . . . , k}. Since
(P, P ′) ∈ TX , we have MX (P ) ⊃ MX (P ′) and there exists no X ∈ X such that
MX (P ) ⊃ X ⊃ MX (P ′). Hence, Sh /∈ X , which contradicts that X is a maximal
nested set. Next, suppose STX (P
′) ∩ Sh 6= ∅ and STX (P ′) ∩ Sm 6= ∅ for some
h,m ∈ {1, . . . , k}, h 6= m. Since STX (P ′) ∈ KL(N), this contradicts that Sh and
Sm both are components of STX (P ) in L. Hence, STX (P
′) is equal to Sh for some
h ∈ {1, . . . , k}, which completes the proof.
Example 5.2 Consider the graph L = {{1, 2}, {2, 3}} on {1, 2, 3} as depicted in
Figure 5a. F = {{1}, {2}, {3}, {1, 2}, {2, 3}, {1, 2, 3}} is the corresponding graphical
coalitional structure on N . F has five maximal nested sets, X 1 = {{1}, {1, 2},
{1, 2, 3}}, X 2 = {{2}, {1, 2}, {1, 2, 3}}, X 3 = {{2}, {2, 3}, {1, 2, 3}}, X 4 = {{3},
{2, 3}, {1, 2, 3}}, X 5 = {{3}, {1}, {1, 2, 3}}, with corresponding coalitional trees as
depicted in Figure 5b.
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Figure 5: Example 5.2.


























Since the collection of networks of a connected graph is a building set, it holds
that on the class of graph games the GC solution and the average coalitional tree
solution coincide.
5.3 Majoritarian coalitional structures
In voting theory literature, a quota rule refers to the case where in order to accept
a proposition the number of supporting votes must be greater than or equal to a
predetermined threshold number which is generally greater than or equal to half of
the total number of votes. Given the set of players N as the set of voters and some
real number q, 12 ≤ q ≤ 1, let F
q = {S ∈ 2N | |S| ≥ qn} be the set of winning
coalitions under the quota majority rule with quota q. Referring to the example
of political parties in the introduction where not all coalitions are feasible, in this
subsection we consider feasible winning coalitions where both the size of the coalition
should exceed a predetermined quota and the coalition itself should be feasible. A
coalitional structure F on N , is q-majoritarian if F ⊆ Fq. Hence a q-majoritarian
coalitional structure on N contains some or all coalitions with cardinality greater
than or equal to qn.
Remark 5.2 For a q-majoritarian coalitional structure F ⊆ Fq on N with 12 ≤ q ≤
1, X ∈ XF and S, S′ ∈ X , it holds that S ⊆ S′ or S′ ⊆ S.
A direct result of Remark 5.2 is that all maximal nested sets of a q-majoritarian
coalitional structure are maximal chains as in Aguilera et al. (2010). Hence, for this
particular case, the ACT solution is the same as the solution defined in Aguilera et
al. (2010). Additional to the restriction on the set system, assume that the worth
of all feasible coalitions is equal to 1. In this case we may focus only on minimal
feasible winning coalitions.
Given a q-majoritarian coalitional structure F on N , let MF be the collection
of minimal feasible winning coalitions. Note that for a q-majoritarian coalitional
structure F , if N ∈ MF then there exist no other member of MF . This can only
happen in case of unanimity voting when F = {N}. Among the members ofMF let
MF (i) be the collection of minimal feasible winning coalitions that contain player i,
i ∈ N . For some i ∈ N it can be the case that MF (i) = ∅ and in case of unanimity
voting when F = {N} we have MF (i) = {N} for all i ∈ N .
Corollary 5.2 For a coalitional game (v,F) where F ⊂ Fq is q-majoritarian for
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, i ∈ N.
5.4 Individualist coalitional structures
A coalitional structure F is individualist if it contains all singletons, i.e., {i} ∈ F
holds for all i ∈ N . In case the coalitional structure F is an arbitrary collection of
feasible coalitions, for some S ∈ 2N there may not exist disjoint feasible coalitions
whose union is equal to S. On the other hand, if F is individualist, then for any
nonempty S ∈ 2N there exists a partition of S in terms of feasible coalitions. Notice
that a building set is an individualist coalitional structure.
Lemma 5.5 Given an individualist coalitional structure F on N , for any X ∈ XF
it holds that PX (i) = {i} for all i ∈ N .
Proof. Suppose there exists X ∈ XF and i ∈ N such that j ∈ PX (i) for some
j 6= i. Hence, MX (i) = MX (j) and since {i}, {j} ∈ F there exists S ∈ X such that
S ⊂MX (i) and for all S′ ⊃ S, S′ +MX (i). This implies that X ∪{{i}} or X ∪{{j}}
is a nested set, which contradicts that X is a maximal nested set.
Similar to the special case where the coalitional structure is a building set, a
direct result of this lemma is that all coalitional trees induced by maximal nested
sets of an individualist coalitional structure are trees. As the following example
illustrates an individualist coalitional structure is not necessarily graphical or a
building set.
Example 5.3 Consider an individualist coalitional structure F = {{1}, {2}, {3},
{4}, {1, 2}, {2, 3}, {1, 2, 3, 4}} on {1, 2, 3, 4}. There are eight maximal nested sets,
X 1 = {{3}, {2, 3}, {4}, {1, 2, 3, 4}}, X 2 = {{2}, {2, 3}, {4}, {1, 2, 3, 4}}, X 3 = {{1},
{1, 2}, {4}, {1, 2, 3, 4}}, X 4 = {{2}, {1, 2}, {4}, {1, 2, 3, 4}}, X 5 = {{2}, {2, 3}, {1},
{1, 2, 3, 4}}, X 6 = {{3}, {2, 3}, {1}, {1, 2, 3, 4}}, X 7 = {{2}, {1, 2}, {3}, {1, 2, 3, 4}},
X 8 = {{1}, {1, 2}, {3}, {1, 2, 3, 4}}. The graphical representation of the correspond-









































Figure 6: The coalitional trees of F in Example 5.3.
5.5 Partitional coalitional structures
In this subsection we consider coalitional structures where for each player the only
alternative of not participating in the grand coalition is to participate in a unique
smaller coalition. A coalitional structure F is partitional if it contains the grand
coalition N and a proper partition of N .
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Lemma 5.6 If F is a partitional coalitional structure on N , then |XF | = |F| − 1.
Proof. Let F = {S1, . . . , Sk, N} where S1, . . . , Sk forms a partition of N for some
k ≥ 2. Then X is a maximal nested set of F if and only if there exists i ∈ {1, . . . , k}
such that X = F \ {Si}. So |X
F | = k, which completes the proof.
A direct result of this lemma is that, given a partitional coalitional structure,
each collection of feasible coalitions that excludes only one of the partition members
is a maximal nested set.
Lemma 5.7 Given a partitional coalitional structure F = {S1, . . . , Sk, N}, if i ∈ Sh
for some h ∈ {1, . . . , k}, then PX (i) = Sh for all X ∈ X
F
.
Proof. Let F = {S1, . . . , Sk, N} be a partitional coalitional structure and X ∈ X
F
.
Take any h ∈ {1, . . . , k} and i ∈ Sh. Suppose Sh ∈ X . Since S1, . . . , Sk forms a
partition of N and Sh ∈ X , we have MX (j) = Sh for all j ∈ Sh. So, PX (i) = Sh.
Next, suppose Sh /∈ X . Since S1, . . . , Sk forms a partition of N and Sh /∈ X , we have
MX (j) = N for all j ∈ Sh. Hence, again PX (i) = Sh, which completes the proof.
Since coalitional trees are defined on the sets of equivalent players, by Lemma
5.7, for a partitional coalitional structure F = {S1, . . . , Sk, N}, all of the induced
coalitional trees are defined on the partition {S1, . . . , Sk}.
Theorem 5.1 Given a coalitional game (v,F) ∈ GN with partitional coalitional
structure F = {S1, . . . , Sk, N}, for all m ∈ {1, . . . , k} it holds that
∑
i∈Sm







Proof. Take any m ∈ {1, . . . , k}. By Lemma 5.6 we have |XF | = k. Let XF =
{X 1, . . .X k}. Then k − 1 of these maximal nested sets contain Sm and only one
of them does not contain Sm. Without loss of generality let Sm ∈ X h holds for




i (v,F) = v(Sm) for h ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1} and for




i (v,F) = v(N)−
∑k−1
h=1 v(Sh). Since the ACT solution is the
average of these marginal vectors, we obtain
∑
i∈Sm ACTi(v,F) = v(Sm) + (v(N)−∑k
h=1 v(Sh))/k.
As Theorem 5.1 shows, given a coalitional game with a partitional coalitional
structure, each member of the partition receives its worth plus an equal share of the
total contribution of all members of the partition while forming the grand coalition.
On the individual level, each player receives an equal share of the total payoff avail-
able to the partition member he belongs to. This is confirmed by the property of
equal treatment of equivalent players, because for the underlying game the players
in any partition member are equivalent to each other.
Example 5.4 Consider a partitional coalitional structure F = {{1, 2, 3}, {4, 5}, {6},
{7}, {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}}. F has four maximal nested sets, X 1 = {{4, 5}, {6}, {7}, {1, 2,
3, 4, 5, 6, 7}}, X 2 = {{1, 2, 3}, {6}, {7}, {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}}, X 3 = {{1, 2, 3}, {4, 5}, {7},
{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}} and X 4 = {{1, 2, 3}, {4, 5}, {6}, {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}}, with corre-
sponding coalitional trees as depicted in Figure 7.
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5.6 (Weakly) union closed coalitional structures
In their paper Algaba et al. (2003) consider antimatroids as a coalitional structure
for a cooperative games. Antimatroids are set systems that are also closed under
union. A coalitional structure F is union closed if S ∪Q ∈ F whenever S, Q ∈ F .
Another concept of set systems is augmenting systems, introduced by Bilbao (2003).
Augmenting systems are set systems that are also weakly union. A coalitional
structure F is weakly union closed if S ∪Q ∈ F whenever S, Q ∈ F and S ∩Q 6= ∅.
Lemma 5.8 Given a union closed coalitional structure F on N , for any maximal
nested set X ∈ XF , if X1, X2 ∈ X then X1 ⊆ X2 or X2 ⊆ X1
Proof. Suppose there exist X1, X2 ∈ X where X1 * X2 and X2 * X1. Since F is
closed under union, X1 ∪X2 ∈ F which violates condition (ii) of Definition 3.1.
The lemma implies that in case of union closed coalitional structure all maximal
nested sets are maximal chains and therefore, for this particular case, the ACT
solution is the same as the solution defined in Aguilera et al. (2010).
Lemma 5.9 Given a weakly union closed coalitional structure F on N , for any
X ∈ XF and P ∈ PX it holds that STX (P ) has a unique maximal partition into
feasible coalitions of F .
Proof. Take any X ∈ XF and P ∈ PX . By condition (iii) of Theorem 3.1, STX (P )
has a unique maximal partition into elements of X , where {STX (P ′) | (P, P ′) ∈ TX }
is that partition. Since X is a maximal nested set, {STX (P ′) | (P, P ′) ∈ TX }
is also a maximal partition of STX (P ) into feasible coalitions. Let {STX (P ′) |
(P, P ′) ∈ TX } = {S1, . . . , Sk} and suppose there exists another maximal partition
{Q1, . . . , Qm} of STX (P ) into feasible coalitions. Then there exists h ∈ {1, . . . , k}
and ` ∈ {1, . . . ,m} such that Sh * Q`, Q` * Sh and Sh ∩Q` 6= ∅. Since F is weakly
union closed, the union of all Sj , j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, such that Sj ∩Q` 6= ∅ is a feasible
coalition, which contradicts that X is a maximal nested set.
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